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The Arctic region is undergoing rapid environmental and socioeconomic change. As one of the most 
rapidly warming places on the planet, the Arctic is experiencing dramatic climate change-related impacts, 
such as a severe downward trend in sea ice cover. The scientific community projects that this trend could 
result in a sea ice-free summer by as early as 2020. As conditions warm, the retreat of sea ice is driving 
an expansion of political and economic activity. Recent world media attention has been focused on the 
Arctic to an unprecedented extent. Much of the discourse has been devoted to a perceived Arctic 
“scramble” or “gold rush” for jurisdictional rights and marine resources, especially potential seabed energy 
resources. This “race” was highlighted by the Russian Federation planting a flag on the seabed of the 
North Pole in August 2007. Also exciting considerable attention is the possibility of the opening up of 
long-sought navigational routes through the Arctic Ocean. 
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BOUNDARIES, BIODIVERSITY, RESOURCES, 
AND INCREASING MARITIME ACTIVITIES:  
EMERGING OCEANS GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES  
FOR CANADA IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN 
 
Dr. Clive Schofield 
Dr. Tavis Potts† 
Ian Townsend-Gault‡ 
INTRODUCTION 
 The Arctic region is undergoing rapid environmental and socioeconomic 
change. As one of the most rapidly warming places on the planet, the Arctic is 
experiencing dramatic climate change-related impacts, such as a severe 
downward trend in sea ice cover. The scientific community projects that this 
trend could result in a sea ice-free summer by as early as 2020.1 As 
conditions warm, the retreat of sea ice is driving an expansion of political 
and economic activity. Recent world media attention has been focused on 
the Arctic to an unprecedented extent. Much of the discourse has been 
devoted to a perceived Arctic “scramble”2 or “gold rush”3 for jurisdictional 
rights and marine resources, especially potential seabed energy resources. 
This “race”4 was highlighted by the Russian Federation planting a flag on 
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 1. See, e.g., Ben Webster, The Arctic Will be Ice-Free in Summer Within 20 Years, Research 
Says, THE TIMES (London), Oct. 15, 2009 (referring to findings by the Polar Ocean Physics Group at the 
University of Cambridge), available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/science/earthenvironment/ 
article6875260.ece. 
 2. See, e.g., Ben Leapman, Denmark Joins the Race to Impose Sovereignty on the North Pole 
Countries: Battle for Ownership of the Underwater Lomonosov Ridge, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), 
Aug. 12, 2007, at 29. 
 3. See, e.g., Paul Reynolds, Russia Ahead in Arctic ‘Gold Rush,’ BBC NEWS, Aug. 1, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/6925853.stm; Paul Reynolds, The Arctic’s New Gold Rush, BBC 
NEWS, Oct. 25, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4354036.stm. 
 4. See, e.g., Brian Beary, Race for the Arctic: Who Owns the Region’s Undiscovered Oil and 
Gas?, 2 CQ GLOBAL RESEARCHER  213–42 (Aug. 2008). 
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the seabed of the North Pole in August 2007.5 Also exciting considerable 
attention is the possibility of the opening up of long-sought navigational 
routes through the Arctic Ocean.  
 This paper explores recent developments in the Arctic region, notably 
in terms of environmental changes.6 The paper then examines some of the 
potential impacts of expanding maritime activities in the Arctic Ocean, 
particularly the Canadian Arctic. These include the exploitation of both 
living and non-living marine resources and increasing Arctic navigational 
opportunities. In this context, it has been suggested that the melting of sea 
ice will render the Northwest Passage open for navigation for significant 
parts of the year. A number of myths and misconceptions surrounding these 
predictions are highlighted. Discussion then turns to the maritime 
jurisdictional claims of the Arctic States, particularly Canada’s claims to 
baselines around its Arctic archipelago, its position regarding the 
jurisdictional status of the waters so enclosed, its claims to control over the 
Passage, and the attitude of other countries to these Canadian claims. 
Finally, emerging options on Arctic oceans governance are provided. 
I. THE CHANGING ARCTIC 
 In 2004, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) identified changes 
over recent decades and the range of potential natural and socioeconomic 
impacts.7 The ACIA highlights the Arctic’s sensitivity to climatic changes, 
while also showing that average temperatures in the region are trending 
upwards. Between 1954 and 2003, the mean annual surface air temperature 
rose by 2 to 3°C in Alaska and Siberia, with winter rises averaging 4°C.8 
The ACIA developed predictions on a range of future climate scenarios. 
From the composites of five ACIA climate models based on the IPCC B2 
scenario (a conservative emissions scenario) a series of predictions were 
made.9 From 1990 to 2090, projected annual temperatures show a uniform 
warming of up to 4°C.10 Greater warming is to be experienced in winter, 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Reynolds, Russia Ahead in Arctic ‘Gold Rush,’ supra note 3. 
 6. The paper develops themes explored by the first two authors in Tavis Potts & Clive 
Schofield, Current Legal Developments: The Arctic, 23 INT’L J. OF MARINE & COASTAL L. 151 (2008); 
and Tavis Potts & Clive Schofield, The Arctic: A Race for Resources or Sustainable Development?, 16 
OCEAN CHALLENGE 19, 19–29 (2009); and by the third author in Ian Townsend-Gault, Not a Carve-up: 
Canada, Sovereignty, and the Arctic Ocean, 1 INT’L ZEITSCHRIFT 3 (2007), http://zeitschrift.co.uk/ 
archivev1n3.html. 
 7.  SUSAN JOY HASSOL, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT  8–12 (2004). 
 8. Id. at 23. 
 9. Id. at 28. 
 10. Id. 
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with temperatures forecasted to rise by 5°C over land and between 7 and 
10°C over the Arctic Ocean and coasts.11 
 In September 2007, the European Space Agency reported that “[t]he 
area covered by sea ice in the Arctic ha[d] shrunk to its lowest level . . . 
since satellite measurements began nearly 30 years ago . . . .”12 The United 
States National Snow and Ice Data Center reported that the average ice 
extent in September 2007 was 4.13 million km2, compared to the 1979–
2000 average of 6.74 million km2.13 The 2009 summer ice extent, recorded 
as 5.36 million km2, was the third-lowest on record.14 The thinning of 
winter sea ice compounds the issue of decreasing summer sea ice extent. 
Overall, the mean ice thickness within the central Arctic Ocean was reduced 
by 40% between the periods of two submarine ice-draft climatologies in 
1958–1976 and 1993–1997.15 
 Increasing temperatures, reduction of sea ice, and an altered 
hydrological regime arguably presage a “step change” in the nature of 
impacts on natural and social systems. Environmental impacts include 
broad-scale changes in marine and terrestrial Arctic habitats and species. 
Changes to migration and breeding behavior, foraging ecology, and 
invasive species could lead to altered species diversity, distribution, and 
abundance.16 For coastal communities, impacts from a warming climate 
include damage to infrastructure from melting permafrost, increased coastal 
erosion, and impacts on health, water, and food supply.17 Not all of the 
changes being experienced in the Arctic are necessarily entirely negative. 
As described below, a range of economic opportunities resulting from an 
altered sea ice regime will change socioeconomic systems in the Arctic and 
bring potential new environmental impacts.18 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Id. 
 12. European Space Agency, Satellites Witness Lowest Arctic Ice Coverage in History, ESA  
PORTAL, Sept. 14, 2007, available at http://www.esa.int/esaCP/SEMYTC13J6F_index_2.html. 
 13. Press Release, National Snow and Ice Data Center, Current Sea Ice Conditions: October 17, 
2007 (Oct. 17, 2007), http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_m seaiceminimum/20070810_index.html. 
 14. Press Release, National Snow and Ice Data Center, Arctic Sea Ice Extent Remains Low; 
2009 Sees Third Lowest Mark (Oct. 6, 2009), http://nsidc.org/news/press/ 20091005_minimumpr.html. 
 15. D. A. Rothrock et al., Thinning of the Arctic Sea Ice-Cover, 26 GEOPHYSICAL RES. 
LETTERS 3469, 3471 (1999). 
 16. See HASSOL, supra note 7, at 62 (stating that climate change will induce “radical changes 
in species composition with unknown consequences”). 
 17. See id. at 78–81 (describing the impacts of climate change on coastal communities in the 
Arctic). 
 18. See id. at 106 (explaining how people will adapt to climate change in the Arctic). 
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II. INCREASING MARITIME ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN 
 The Arctic region has been affected by long-standing anthropogenic 
activities, particularly resource exploitation such as hunting, fishing, 
reindeer husbandry, forestry, mining, oil and gas extraction, dumping, and 
navigation.19 Furthermore, the significant environmental changes outlined 
above suggest that human activities in the Arctic are likely to increase 
considerably in the future. 
 Arctic, and especially sub-Arctic, waters are known for their highly 
productive fisheries, with several important fish stocks exploited since the 
mid-twentieth century, most notably in the Bering and Barents Seas.20 As a 
consequence of retreating sea ice, the warming Arctic environment is likely 
to lead to migration and changes in the population dynamics of key 
fisheries and provide access to previously inaccessible areas and stocks.21 
While the potential impacts of changes to the Arctic marine ecosystem and 
impacts on the sustainability of fisheries are not well known, it nonetheless 
appears likely that Arctic species potentially will be vulnerable to 
overfishing.22 The ACIA report suggests that changes to the Arctic 
environment will result in major changes in species distribution and 
productivity, which will trigger further impacts on associated and 
dependant species in the trophic ecology of the Arctic.23 It may be that 
moderate warming of Arctic waters will lead to increasing productivity for 
certain stocks, such as herring and cod, through increased habitat and prey 
productivity.24 Arctic ecosystems, however, are complex and are by no 
means fully understood in the context of changing climatic, ecological, and 
oceanographic conditions.25 While productivity may increase in some 
species, decreases could occur in other dependant and associated species.26  
 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Potts & Schofield, The Arctic: A Race for Resources or Sustainable Development?, supra 
note 6, at 19. 
 20. HASSOL, supra note 7, at 62. 
 21. Recent studies are showing several fisheries shifting northward as water temperatures 
increase. The ACIA reports that warming bottom water temperatures in the Bering Strait are resulting in 
a northward shift in some fisheries species seeking colder and deeper waters and have impacts on 
predator–prey relationships. In the North Atlantic, it has been reported that cod and haddock have 
shifted 60 to 70 km north. HASSOL, supra note 7, at 64; see also Potts & Schofield, The Arctic: A Race 
for Resources or Sustainable Development?, supra note 6, at 26. 
 22. David Barber, Louis Fortier & Michael Byers, The Incredible Shrinking Sea Ice, 27 
OPTIONS POLITIQUES 66, 68 (2005–2006). 
 23. HASSOL, supra note 7, at 68–69.   
 24. Id. at 62. 
 25. Id. at 14. 
 26. Id. 
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These developments are likely to complicate arrangements for the 
management of Arctic living resources.  
 There is also growing interest in Arctic marine living resources as a 
source of genetic material.27 The often remarkable ways in which species 
have adapted to the Arctic’s unique and harsh environment have served to 
make these resources increasingly desirable. This, in turn, raises issues 
related to the preservation of biodiversity and the management of 
bioprospecting.28  
 It has also been suggested that the Arctic offers great potential in terms 
of seabed energy resources. The United States Geological Survey’s (USGS) 
2008 Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal pointed to the existence of over 7 
million km2 of Arctic continental shelf areas under less than 500 meters of 
water.29 Furthermore, it posited that these shallow continental shelf areas 
“may constitute the geographically largest unexplored prospective area for 
petroleum remaining on Earth.”30 The USGS report went on to conclude 
that, overall, the Arctic may hold around 22% of undiscovered, technically 
recoverable resources globally,31 potentially consisting of 90 billion barrels 
of oil (13% of global undiscovered oil); 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural 
gas (30% of undiscovered gas); and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids 
(20% of undiscovered liquids).32  
 However, not all predictions agree. It is noticeable that, as a result of 
the difficulties of gathering data in the Arctic’s harsh conditions, the USGS 
findings were based on a “probabilistic” analytical methodology.33 In 
contrast, a survey drawing on detailed geoscientific analysis of individual 
Arctic basins, supported by oil industry data on exploration wells and 
existing discoveries, offers a significantly less optimistic picture.34  
                                                                                                                 
 27. See DAVID LEARY, UNU-IAS REPORT: BIOPROSPECTING IN THE ARCTIC 24 (2008) 
(identifying 43 commercially active companies that are engaged in research  and exploitation of 
biotechnology based on Arctic resources, including the existence of 31 patents on specific Arctic genetic 
resources). 
 28. Potts & Schofield, The Arctic: A Race for Resources or Sustainable Development?,  supra 
note 6, at 27. 
 29. CIRCUM-ARCTIC RESOURCE APPRAISAL ASSESSMENT TEAM, USGS, Circum-Arctic 
Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle para. 2  (Peter H. 
Shauffer ed., 2008), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Press Release, USGS, 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural 
Gas Assessed in the Arctic, July 23, 2008, http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980&from= 
rss_home. 
 32. CIRCUM-ARCTIC RESOURCE APPRAISAL ASSESSMENT TEAM, supra note 29, ¶ 8. 
 33. Id. at para. 3. 
 34. The joint Wood MacKenzie and Fugro Robertson study, Future of the Arctic, released on 1 
November 2006, provided estimates of three million barrels of oil per day and five million barrels of gas 
equivalent per day at peak production. Press Release, Wood Mackenzie & Fugro Robertson, Future of 
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 Even if the Arctic seabed does contain globally significant hydrocarbon 
resource potential, enormous challenges to exploring, exploiting, and 
transporting these resources remain. In particular, it appears likely that 
subsea technology, which can operate underneath sea ice cover, will be 
required.35 Furthermore, both of the studies mentioned above agree that the 
Arctic is likely to be predominantly gas-prone. This necessarily has 
implications for the development of these resources because remote gas 
presents considerable transportation challenges. Consequently, the 
exploitation of a large portion of Arctic seabed resources appears unlikely 
in the near-term.36  
 Nonetheless, there exists a strong perception that the Arctic may yield 
seabed energy resource riches, and this perception helps underpin claims to 
maritime jurisdiction. For example, in one of the final acts of his 
presidency, outgoing U.S. President George W. Bush, issued a National 
Security Directive stating that “[e]nergy development in the Arctic region 
will play an important role in meeting growing global energy demand” 
because of the “substantial portion” of global undiscovered energy 
resources thought to exist there.37  
III. MELTING ICE—OPENING SHIPPING LANES? 
 Conventional wisdom suggests that as the Arctic warms, sea ice 
coverage will be reduced and thus the seasonal Arctic navigational 
“window” will expand.38 Indeed, a key finding of the ACIA report was that 
“[r]educed sea ice is very likely to increase marine transport and access to 
                                                                                                                 
the Arctic (Nov. 1, 2006), reprinted in Dave Cohen, Arctic Dreams, ENERGY BULLETIN, Apr. 25, 2007, 
http://www.energybulletin.net/node/29151. Overall, the November 2007 report concluded that its 
findings were “disappointing from a world oil resource base perspective” and “calls into question the 
long-considered view that the Arctic represents one of the last great oil and gas frontiers and a strategic 
energy supply cache for the US.” Wood Mackenzie & Fugro Robertson, Arctic Role Diminished in 
World Oil Supply, 234 Pipeline & Gas Journal 2 (February 2007), available at http://www.epmag.com/ 
archives/newsAnalysis/102.htm. 
 35. Press Release, Wood Mackenzie & Fugro Robertson, Exploration in the Arctic Has a Long 
Term Future (Nov. 15, 2006), reprinted in Dave Cohen, Arctic Dreams, ENERGY BULLETIN, Apr. 25, 
2007, http://www.energybulletin.net/node/29151. 
 36. Potts & Schofield, The Arctic: A Race for Resources or Sustainable Development?, supra 
note 6, at 24–26. 
 37. Memorandum from The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Directive on 
Arctic Region Policy, § III(G)(2) (Jan. 9, 2009) (on file with the Nat’l Sci. Found.), available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/ may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf. 
 38. Claes L. Ragner, Den norra sjövägen, Barents—ett gränsland i Norden [The Northern Sea 
Route, THE BARENTS—A NORDIC BORDERLAND] (Torsten Hallberg ed., Fridtjof Nansen Inst. tran., 
2008), http://www.fni.no/publ/marine.html (follow “Ragner, Claes Lykke: ‘Den norra sjövägen’”) 
(discussing the growing opportunity for transit during summer sea ice melt). 
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resources.”39 This scenario has stirred long-standing, but also long-dormant, 
dreams of opening the shipping routes between the Atlantic and the Pacific 
Oceans by way of the Arctic—namely the Northwest Passage and the 
Northern Sea Route (formerly known as the Northeast Passage).40 Indeed, 
even a transpolar “over-the-top” route has been suggested.41 
 It is not difficult to understand the abiding lure of these routes. The 
Northwest Passage offers a staggering 9,000 km (4,860 nautical miles 
(nm))42 distance saving over the traditional route between Europe and Asia 
via the Panama Canal and a 17,000 km (9,180 nm) saving as compared with 
the Cape Horn route.43 Navigation traffic in the Arctic is clearly on the rise, 
led by increasing “adventure cruising”44 in Arctic waters, increased support 
traffic for oil and gas developments on the periphery of the Arctic,45 and to 
some extent from the pursuit of migrating stocks by fishing fleets.46 
Furthermore, satellite imagery showed the Northwest Passage to be ice-free 
at the September ice minimum in 2007 and 2008.47 
 Nevertheless, there exist strong reasons to doubt the viability of such 
routes for large-scale, regular inter-oceanic transportation in the near-term. 
The first and most obvious factor that mitigates against the use of the 
Northwest Passage for regular inter-oceanic transits is that, while the 
waterway (or rather, waterways) in question may be ice-free at the end of 
the Arctic summer, the Arctic navigational “window” is still narrow.48 For 
much of the year—and year-round in the event of a cold summer—ice is 
likely to remain a key factor and a threat to safety of navigation.49  The 
                                                                                                                 
 39. HASSOL, supra note 7, at 11. 
 40. See Ragner, supra note 38 (discussing the long-held vision of the “Northeast Passage” as 
an “adventurous shortcut” with the potential of bringing a revolution in sea trade). 
 41. See Hon. Norman Yakeleya, Member of the Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories, 
Statement to the Legislative Assembly (June 2, 2008), available at http://www.exec.gov.nt.ca/ 
currentnews/speechDetails.asp?varStatement_ID=684 (assuming eventual presence of polar route). 
 42. While it is acknowledged that “M” is the technically correct abbreviation for a nautical 
mile, with “nm” referring to nanometres, “nm” is used to denote nautical miles here as this abbreviation 
is widely used by many authorities (for example the United Nations Office of Ocean Affairs and the 
Law of the Sea) and appears to cause less confusion than “M”, which is often assumed to be an 
abbreviation for metres.  
 43. Katherine J. Wilson et al., Shipping in the Canadian Arctic: Other Possible Climate 
Change Scenarios, 3 GEOSCIENCE & REMOTE SENSING SYMP. 1853, 1853 (2004). 
 44. B. Stonehouse, Polar Environments, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECOTOURISM 219, 227 
(David B. Weaver ed., 2001). 
 45. HASSOL, supra note 7, at 11. 
 46. Id. at 84. 
 47. Press Release, National Snow and Ice Data Center, Arctic Sea Ice Reaches Annual 
Minimum Extent (Sept. 17, 2009) (on file with author) http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/. 
 48. Ragner, supra note 38. 
 49. See Patrick R.M. Toomey, Global Warming: Arctic Shipping, MERIDIAN (Canadian Polar 
Commission, Ottawa, Ont.) Fall/Winter 2007, at 10, available at http://www.polarcom.gc.ca/ 
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hazardous nature of navigation in the Arctic will necessarily have 
implications in terms of operating costs, both as a result of the need to use 
ice-strengthened vessels with ice-breaker support in some cases and 
potentially vast increases in insurance costs (if insurers can, in fact, be 
found).50 Despite shorter transit distances, these factors are likely to entail 
delays and increased costs which will tend to erode the savings.51 
Furthermore, there have been indications that even with a rise in 
temperatures, there will be only a marginal lengthening in the summer 
sailing season. In fact, navigation through the Northwest Passage may even 
become considerably more hazardous as softer first-year ice in the channels 
between the islands of the Canadian Arctic archipelago melts and causes 
hard multi-year sea ice from the central Arctic Ocean to drift into and 
essentially “fill in” the Northwest Passage.52 
 In practical terms, therefore, it appears that the Northwest Passage is 
not a viable international sea lane, at least in the immediate future. This, in 
turn, may have implications for the long-standing international legal dispute 
over the status of the Northwest Passage.53 At the crux of this dispute is 
whether the Northwest Passage constitutes a strait “‘used for international 
navigation’” within the meaning of Article 37 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).54 If it is such a strait, as the U.S. 
and others maintain, then an unfettered and non-suspendable right of transit 
passage applies.55 Canada, in contrast, asserts that the Northwest Passage is 
not a strait used for international navigation and that it has jurisdiction over 
the waters within the straight baselines it has declared around the Canadian 
Arctic archipelago.56 A key element in the Canadian argument is that 
because of the infrequent past and present usage, particularly the paucity of 
                                                                                                                 
media.php?mid=3278 (noting exceptionally high insurance rates as an illustration of the dangers of sea 
ice navigation). 
 50. Id. at 10. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Katherine J. Wilson et al., supra note 43, at 1854. 
 53. For recent Canadian and U.S. perspectives on this issue, see Michael Byers & Suzanne 
Lalonde, Who Controls the Northwest Passage?, CANADA’S ARCTIC WATERS IN INT’L LAW & 
DIPLOMACY 1, 10–11 (2006) (discussing the political and legal significance of the Northwest Passage 
opening due to climate change, including the positions Canada and the United States have taken in the 
debate); James Kraska, The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage, 22 INT’L J. MARINE 
& COASTAL LAW 257, 258–60 (2007) (explaining that the “inflow of shipping traffic has revived debate 
over the legal status of the route”); see also Donat Pharand, The Arctic Waters and the Northwest 
Passage: A Final Revisit, 38 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L LAW 3, 4, 28–44 (2007) (discussing the “legal debate 
over the status of the Arctic waters generally and of the Northwest Passage in particular”). 
 54. Byers & Lalonde, supra note 53, at 23. 
 55. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 37–44, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter LOSC]. 
 56. Byers & Lalonde, supra note 53, at 25–26. 
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non-consensual transits, the Northwest Passage is not a strait used for 
international navigation.57 As such, it should not be considered to be in the 
same category as, for instance, the Straits of Hormuz or Malacca.58  
 The U.S. has long desired to preserve freedom of navigation through 
international straits, and the U.S. position on the Northwest Passage should 
be viewed through this geostrategic lens. Indeed, the National Security 
Presidential Directive of January 9, 2009, notes the U.S.’s “broad and 
fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region,” including 
“freedom of navigation and overflight [sic]” rights, which the Directive 
termed a “top national priority.”59 The Directive went on to explicitly assert 
that the U.S. views both the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route as 
“straits used for international navigation” to which the regime of transit 
passage open to the vessels of all nations applies.60 
 Recognizing that increasing navigation in the Arctic region carries with 
it the risk of maritime accidents, Canada has moved to assert additional 
jurisdictional measures over navigation in the Canadian Arctic. Its 
government promulgated the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act in 
1970.61 In August of 2008, Canada announced that it would extend the 
application of its Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act from 100 nm to 
200 nm and make use of its Arctic marine traffic scheme, NORDREG, 
mandatory.62 Article 234 of LOSC provides the international legal basis for 
these efforts to give Canada’s Arctic waterways special protection. This 
article allows coastal states to adopt and enforce nondiscriminatory 
provisions with the objective of preventing, reducing, and controlling 
marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas of their exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs), where severe climatic conditions and the presence 
of ice cover “for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards 
to navigation . . . .” 63 
 The logic of these developments would seem to be self-evident given 
the enormous damage to the fragile Arctic environment that would result 
from a major shipping catastrophe in hazardous high latitude waters. 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 10–11, 25–26. 
 58. Richard B. McNees, Freedom of Transit through International Straits, 6 J. MAR. L. & 
COM. 175, 182–84 (1975). 
 59. Presidential Directive, supra note 37, § III(B)(1),(5). 
 60.  Id. § III(B)(5). 
 61. Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C., ch. A 12 (1985); see Penny Becklumb, Bill 
C-3: An Act to Amend the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, LS-617(E), at 7 (2008) (giving a 
brief history of the Act and its purposes). 
 62. Press Release, Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada, Backgrounder - Extending the 
Jurisdiction of Canadian Environment and Shipping Laws in the Arctic (Aug. 27, 2008), 
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/ media.asp?id=2246. 
 63. LOSC, supra note 55, at art. 234. 
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Nevertheless, Canada’s new regulations are likely to result in fresh 
contention between Canada and the U.S. in their long-standing dispute over 
the legal status of the Northwest Passage.  
IV. ARCTIC MARITIME CLAIMS 
 The Arctic Ocean is a semi-enclosed sea almost surrounded by five 
coastal states: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway (Svalbard), Russia, 
and the U.S. All of these states, with the notable exception of the U.S., are 
parties to the LOSC.64 However, it should be noted that the U.S. generally 
regards the LOSC as being reflective of customary international law and 
pursues its oceans policy accordingly.65 
 All of the Arctic littoral States, including the U.S., have advanced 
claims consistent with the LOSC, generally 12 nm of territorial seas and 
200 nm of EEZs.66 In Canada’s case, the breadth of its maritime claims is 
not contested, but where they are measured from has been the source of 
some disagreement.  
 Canada first declared that it would draw straight baselines around the 
Canadian Arctic archipelago in response to the transit of the Northwest 
Passage by the American ice-breaking Coast Guard vessel Polar Sea in 
1985.67 Article 7 of the LOSC provides that straight baselines may be 
constructed along coasts that are either “deeply indented and cut into” or 
where there exists “a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate 
vicinity . . . .”68  Article 7 also requires that “[t]he drawing of straight 
baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general 
direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be 
sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of 
                                                                                                                 
  64. UNITED NATIONS, STATUS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE 
SEA, TABLE RECAPITULATING THE STATUS OF THE CONVENTION AND OF THE RELATED AGREEMENTS, 
AS OF 1 OCTOBER 2009 (2009), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2008.pdf [hereinafter 
CONVENTION TABLE ON RELATED AGREEMENTS]. 
 65. J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE 
MARITIME CLAIMS 5–6 (2d ed. 1996). 
 66. The exception to this rule is Denmark which, on behalf of Greenland, claims a 200 nm 
fishing zone rather than a 200 nm EEZ. See Robin R. Churchill, Claims to Maritime Zones in the 
Arctic—Law  of the Sea Normality or Polar Peculiarity?, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND POLAR 
MARITIME DELIMITATION AND JURISDICTION 116–19 (Alex G. Oude Elferink & Donald R. Rothwell 
eds., 2001) (discussing these fishing zone and EEZ arrangements). 
 67. Suzanne Lalonde, Increased Traffic through Canadian Arctic Waters: Canada’s State of 
Readiness, 38 REVUE JURIDQUE THEMIS 49, 65–67 (2004). This was duly accomplished by means of the 
Territorial Sea Geographical Coordinates (Area 7) Order. Territorial Sea Geographical Coordinates 
(Area 7) Order SOR/85-872 (Can.). 
 68. LOSC, supra note 55, at art. 7(1). 
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internal waters.”69 The lack of precision inherent in these key terms of 
Article 7 has led one eminent commentator to observe that “the imprecise 
language [of Article 7] would allow any coastal country, anywhere in the 
world, to draw straight baselines along its coast . . . .”70 Nonetheless, 
support for the more conservative view advocated by the United States and 
others71 can be found in the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) decision 
in the Qatar/Bahrain Case of 2001, which stated unequivocally that the 
method of straight baselines in accordance with Article 7 of the LOSC 
“must be applied restrictively.”72 It remains questionable whether Canada’s 
straight baselines claims are in keeping with the terms of Article 7 of the 
LOSC—that is, whether the islands comprising Canada’s Arctic 
archipelago really represent fringing islands and whether the waters so 
enclosed are closely enough linked to the land domain to be considered 
internal waters. Certainly Canada’s straight baselines claims do not appear 
to be in keeping with the more restrictive interpretation of Article 7 
advocated by the ICJ.  That said, the majority of state practice with regards 
to straight baselines appears to run contrary to such a conservative reading 
of Article 7. Nevertheless, that fact represents a less than compelling 
argument in favor of Canada’s own arguably excessive claim. 
 An additional complication and source of dispute in Canada’s Arctic 
claims is its assertion that the waters enclosed by its straight baselines in the 
Arctic are not merely internal waters, but “historic internal waters.”73 The 
concept of historic waters represents one of the more nebulous areas of 
international law. The only reference to historic waters in the LOSC occurs 
in the final paragraph of Article 10, which deals with bays and refers to “so-
called ‘historic’ bays”74—hardly a ringing endorsement of the concept. 
Indeed, historic waters have been dubbed “an orphaned offshore 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. at art. 7(3); see also VICTOR PRESCOTT & CLIVE SCHOFIELD, THE MARITIME POLITICAL 
BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD 154–56 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing Article 7 and the rules governing the 
construction of straight baselines along appropriate coasts). 
 70. J. R.V. PRESCOTT, THE MARITIME POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD 64 (1985). 
 71. The United States in particular has been a keen advocate of a conservative or restrictive 
interpretation of Article 7, even going so far as to publish its own guidelines on the proper application of 
Article 7 of the LOSC.  BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT’L. ENVTL. & SCI. AFF., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PUB. 
NO. 106, LIMITS IN THE SEAS (1987). See also Roach & Smith, supra note 65, at 57–146 (describing the 
United States restrictive application of excessive baselines). 
 72. Maritime Delimitation & Territorial Questions Between Qatar & Bahrain (Qatar v. 
Bahrain), 2001 I.C.J. 40, 103 (Mar. 16). See id. at 103–04 (declining to employ straight or archipelagic 
baselines to the Bahraini coast, citing Bahrain’s failure to declare archipelagic status and thereafter 
define a system of archipelagic straight baselines).  
 73.
 
Donat Pharand, Historic Waters in International Law with Special Reference to the Arctic, 
21 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 2 (1971). See also Byers & Lalonde, supra note 53, at 10–11 (discussing 
Canada’s claims to historic internal waters in its Arctic archipelago).
 
 74. LOSC, supra note 55, at art.10(3). 
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international legal regime” on account of the fact that they were left out of 
both the 1958 Conventions and LOSC.75 To date, there has been no 
authoritative pronouncement as to how and when historic waters should be 
applied.76 The United States has predictably (given its freedom of 
navigation concerns) taken a restrictive view: “To meet the international 
standard for establishing a claim to historic waters, a State must 
demonstrate its open, effective, long term, and continuous exercise of 
authority over the body of water, coupled with acquiescence by foreign 
States in the exercise of that authority.”77 The United States has also argued 
that, given the extension of coastal State territorial sea claims to 12 nm 
under the LOSC, “no new claim to historic bay or historic waters is needed 
to meet resource and security interests of the coastal State.”78 While the 
United States view is not the only one, the general trend appears to be for 
claims to historic waters to be restricted to relatively confined marine areas 
that are dominated by—and often largely surrounded by—a particular State. 
It is highly questionable whether the extensive waters enclosed by Canada’s 
straight baselines around its Arctic archipelago fall into this category. 
A. Arctic Maritime Delimitation 
 By no means have all of the potential maritime boundaries in the Arctic 
Ocean been delimited. This is, however, not remarkable when one considers 
that the majority of potential maritime boundaries around the world are only 
partially delimited, if they are agreed upon at all.79 In general, the Arctic 
Ocean is mercifully bereft of territorial disputes. The exception to the rule is 
Hans Island, sovereignty over which is contested by Canada and Denmark 
(on behalf of Greenland).80 Hans Island, which has an area of approximately 
1 km2, is located in the Nares Strait between Ellesmere Island and 
Greenland.81 However, this dispute did not prevent the parties from 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Ted L. McDorman, Notes on the Historic Waters Regime and the Bay of Fundy, in THE 
FUTURE OF OCEAN REGIME BUILDING: ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON 701, 701 (Aldo 
Chircop et. al eds., 2009). 
 76. The classic work on this issue is: Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic 
Bays, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143 (1962), reprinted in [1962] 2 Y. B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1962/Add.1. 
 77. ROACH & SMITH, supra note 65, at 31. 
 78. Id. at 37. 
 79. PRESCOTT & SCHOFIELD, supra note 69, at 217–18. 
 80. Id. at 265; Christopher Stevenson, Hans Off!: The Struggle for Hans Island and the 
Potential Ramifications for International Border Dispute Resolution, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
263, 263–66 (2007). 
 81. PRESCOTT & SCHOFIELD, supra note 69, at 265; Canada Island Visit Angers Danes, BBC 
NEWS, July 25, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4715245.stm. 
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concluding a continental shelf boundary agreement in 1973 using an 
equidistance line between opposite main island coasts on either side as a 
basis for delimitation.82 Canada and Denmark were able to side-step their 
dispute over Hans Island by ignoring the island for the purposes of drawing 
their seabed maritime boundary.83 
 Canada’s potential maritime boundary with the United States in the 
Beaufort Sea is also in dispute. The U.S. insists on an equidistance line as a 
basis for delimitation, but Canada argues that the maritime boundary should 
be a seaward extension of the 141ºW meridian, which provides the 
boundary between Alaska and the Yukon Territory. These positions 
represent the conventional approach (United States) and the sector-based 
approach (Canada), the two main approaches to maritime boundary 
delimitation.84  While the sector-based approach is clearly more favourable 
to Canada in the area immediately offshore of the coast, it is worth pointing 
out that overall Canada’s sector-based approach (if agreed to by its 
neighbouring States) would deliver considerably less maritime space to 
Canada than the application of strict equidistance lines. 
B. Overlapping Outer Continental Shelves in the Central Arctic Ocean 
 Even if the 200 nm EEZ claims of the Arctic littoral States are taken 
into account, a large area in the central Arctic Ocean lies seaward of these 
200nm jurisdictional limits. As such, these areas are considered part of the 
high seas, even if they are (presently at least) ice-covered for much of the 
year.85 However, there are large portions of the seabed underlying this high 
seas “pocket” or “donut hole” that do not, necessarily form part of the 
international seabed—that portion of the seabed beyond national 
jurisdiction, which is referred to as “the Area.”86 
 In accordance with the provisions of Article 76 of the LOSC, the Arctic 
littoral States that are parties to the LOSC have made, or are in the process 
of preparing, submissions to the relevant United Nations scientific body—
                                                                                                                 
 82. See THE AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L., INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES: VOL. 1 371–72 
(Jonathan Chaney & Lewis Alexander eds., 1993) (discussing the terms of the  agreement); PRESCOTT & 
SCHOFIELD, supra note 69, at 265 (describing the agreement as “innovative” because it simply ignores 
the disputed island in order to facilitate a larger agreement). 
 83. Consequently, there is a gap in the boundary line which stops just short of Hans Island to 
the south and then continues just to the north of it. PRESCOTT & SCHOFIELD, supra note 69, at 265. 
 84. Id. at 539. 
 85. See LOSC, supra note 55, at art. 86 (applying the provisions governing the “high seas” to 
“all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the 
internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State”). 
 86. Id. at part XI; see also Allison Winter, U.S. Bans Commercial Fishing in Warming Arctic, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009 (describing the regulation-free areas in the Arctic). 
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the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). Through 
this process these States will define the outer limits of their continental 
shelf rights beyond 200 nm from the coast.87 Article 76(1) of the LOSC 
establishes that the continental shelf of a coastal state consists of “the 
seabed and the subsoil of submarine areas,” extending to a distance of 200 
nm from relevant baselines or “throughout the natural prolongation of its 
land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin . . . .”88 Thus, in 
accordance with the EEZ concept (codified through the LOSC), every 
coastal State has the right to claim sovereign rights over both the seabed 
and water column out to 200 nm, regardless of whether the continental 
margin actually extends that distance offshore and provided that there are 
no overlapping claims with neighboring states.89 Alternatively, where 
coastal States are positioned on broad continental margins, they are able to 
assert rights over those parts of the continental shelf beyond the 200 nm 
EEZ limit forming part of their natural prolongation.90 These areas of 
continental shelf beyond the 200 nm limit are frequently referred to as the 
“outer” or “extended” continental shelf.91  
 Article 76 of the LOSC goes on to lay down a complex series of 
formulae through which the coastal state can define and establish its rights 
to the outer edge of its continental shelf areas beyond the 200 nm limit. 
Essentially, Article 76 provides two formulae by which coastal states can 
establish the existence of a continental margin beyond the 200 nm limit: the 
“Gardiner Line,” which is based on reference to depth or thickness of 
                                                                                                                 
 87. LOSC, supra note 55, at art. 76. 
 88. Id. ¶ 1. 
 89. These rights, however, are governed in accordance with Part VI (dealing with the 
continental shelf) of the Convention rather than Part V (dealing with the EEZ).  Id. at arts. 55, 57, 76. 
 90. While no sure figure can be determined until all outer continental shelf submissions have 
been considered by the CLCS, it has been estimated that outer continental shelf areas may encompass 
around five percent of the ocean floor. Peter J. Cook & Chris M. Carleton, Introduction to 
CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS: THE SCIENTIFIC AND LEGAL INTERFACE 3, 3 (Peter J. Cook & Chris M. 
Carleton eds., 2000). 
 91. See id. (noting the existence of 15 million km2 of extended shelf area “which lies beyond 
the 200 [nm] limit, to which sovereign rights may also extend under the terms of the Convention”). It is 
worth noting that the term “extended continental shelf” gives a somewhat misleading impression that 
coastal States are somehow advancing claims to “additional” areas of continental shelf. However, 
because continental shelf rights are inherent to the coastal State, this is not, in fact, the case. Instead, 
coastal States and the CLCS are engaged in determining the proper location for the outer limits of the 
continental shelf seawards of the 200 nm limit. See LOSC, supra note 55, at  art. 77(3) (stating that 
continental shelf rights are inherent and “do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any 
express proclamation”); North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 23 (Feb. 20) (stating that “the rights of the coastal State in respect of the 
area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea 
exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land . . .” and that “[i]n short, there is 
here an inherent right” to such territory).  
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sedimentary rocks overlying the continental crust,92 or the “Hedberg Line,” 
which is established 60 nm from the foot of the continental slope.93 Two 
maximum constraints or “cut-off” lines are then applied: either a distance of 
350 nm from relevant baselines or 100 nm from the 2,500 meter isobath.94 
In order to make these calculations and thus establish entitlement to outer 
continental shelf areas in accordance with Article 76, a coastal state is 
required to gather information related to the morphology of its continental 
margin, its geological characteristics, and bathymetric information relating 
to water depth.95 Additionally, geodetically robust distance measurements 
are necessary in order to determine, for example, the location of 200 nm 
and 350 nm limit lines.96 Although complex, the point here is that Article 
76 of the LOSC provides for a definable outer limit to the continental shelf 
claims of coastal states, which represents a major step forward compared to the 
indeterminate situation under the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.97 
 Suggestions that the Arctic littoral States are engaged in a form of 
“land grab” are therefore misplaced.98 While coastal states are engaged in a 
race of sorts to gather the scientific information, all are doing so in 
accordance with the terms of the LOSC.99 
 Submissions are made to the CLCS, the United Nations technical body 
that provides recommendations upon which the coastal State should rely to 
declare final and binding outer shelf limits.100 Both Russia (December 
2001) and Norway (on behalf of Spitzbergen, December 2006) have made 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), May 3–14, 1999, Scientific 
and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, § 8.1.3, U.N. Doc. 
CLCS/11 (May 13, 1999) [hereinafter CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines]. 
 93. Id. § 5.4.8. 
 94. LOSC, supra note 55, at art. 76(4)–(5). 
 95. Steinar Thor Gudlaugsson, Natural Prolongation and the concept of the Continental 
Margin for the Purpose of Article 76, in LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF CONTINENTAL SHELF 
LIMITS 61, 66 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2004).  
 96. See CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines, supra note 92, § 9.2 (laying out the 
guidelines for acceptable bathymetric and geodetic measurements). 
 97. Article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 defined the continental shelf 
as “to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of 
the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas . . . .” Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 
1, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311;  see also Ted L. McDorman, The Role of the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf: A Technical Body in a Political World, 17 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL 
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continental shelf claims, “however difficult the defining of that limit may be”). 
 98. David R. Sands, Sea Treaty Sparks Rivalries; Senate Fight Looms Amid Race to North 
Pole, WASH. TIMES, Nov.12, 2007, at A01. 
 99. Id.  
 100. McDorman, supra note 97, at 301. 
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submissions.101 In 2002, the Commission indicated that Russia should make 
a revised submission.102 Russia is understood to be engaged in undertaking 
surveys aimed at gathering additional information, especially in the Arctic 
Ocean, to be included in its revised submission. It remains to be seen how 
the Commission will deal with the complex and contentious issue of 
submarine ridges in the Arctic Ocean.103 Both Russia and Denmark (on 
behalf of Greenland) indicated that they consented to the Commission 
proceeding to examine Norway’s submission without prejudice to the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries at a later stage.104 Russia also made a 
point of noting that the Commission’s work did not prejudice its position 
with respect to Spitsbergen.105 The Commission duly provided Norway with 
recommendations on the outer limits of its continental shelf on March 27, 
2009.106 The deadline for submission for Canada is 2013 and Denmark the 
following year—ten years after each of these States became parties to 
                                                                                                                 
 101. The executive summaries of these submissions are available on the Commission’s website 
at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm. See U.N. Comm’n of the 
Limits of the Cont’l Shelf, Statement by the Chairman of the Comm’n on the Limits of the Cont’l Shelf 
on the progress of work in the Comm’n, U.N. Doc. CLCS/32 (Apr. 12, 2009), available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=CLCS/32 (Russian Federation); U.N. Comm’n of the 
Limits of the Cont’l Shelf, Statement by the Chairman of the Comm’n on the Limits of the Cont’l Shelf 
on the progress of work in the Comm’n, U.N. Doc. CLCS/54 (Apr. 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=CLCS/54 (Norway). 
 102. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 
¶ 41, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. DOC. A/57/57/Add.1 (Oct. 8, 2002). 
 103. The key difficulty here is distinguishing between “submarine elevations” and “submarine 
ridges” and determining how the cut-off lines provided for in Article 76 should be applied to such 
features. LOSC, supra note 55, at art. 76(6). Much has been written on this problematic issue. See 
generally Philip Symonds et al., Ridge Issues, in CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS: THE SCIENTIFIC AND 
LEGAL INTERFACE 285 (Peter J. Cook & Chris M. Carleton eds., 2000); Ron MacNab, Submarine 
Elevations and Ridges: Wild Cards in the Poker Game of UNCLOS Article 76, 39 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L 
L. 223 (2008). 
 104. U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, Comm’n on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, OUTER LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF BEYOND 200 NAUTICAL MILES FROM 
THE BASELINES: REACTION TO THE SUBMISSIONS TO THE COMMISSION MADE BY THE KINGDOM OF 
NORWAY, NOTE FROM DENMARK (Jan. 24, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ 
clcs_new/submissions_ files/submission_nor.htm (follow link to “Note dated 24 January 2007”); U.N. 
DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, Comm’n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 
OUTER LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF BEYOND 200 NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE BASELINES: 
REACTION TO THE SUBMISSIONS TO THE COMMISSION MADE BY THE KINGDOM OF NORWAY, NOTE FROM 
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, (2007), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions 
_files/submission_nor.htm (follow link to “Note dated 21 February 2007”) [hereinafter NOTE FROM THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION]. 
 105. NOTE FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note 104. 
 106. U.N. Comm’n of the Limits of the Cont’l Shelf, Summary of the Recommendations of the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Norway in 
Respect of Areas in the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea on 27 November 2006, 
U.N. Doc CLCS/40/Rev. 1, Annex VI (Mar. 27,  2009)  (providing a summary of the recommendations 
made by the Commission in respect of Norway’s submission). 
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LOSC.107 As a non-party to the LOSC, no deadline has been set for the 
United States.108 
 Some experts have suggested that the vast majority of the central 
Arctic seabed may form part of the outer continental shelf entitlements of 
the Arctic coastal states, with the possible exception of four “donut holes” 
beyond national jurisdiction.109 Given that the Arctic Ocean is virtually 
surrounded by the territories of the Arctic coastal States, all of which share 
large areas of continental margin in the Arctic, the maritime entitlements of 
the Arctic States are likely to converge and overlap. However, it should be 
emphasized that the Commission will not resolve these potentially 
contentious issues. The Commission is a scientific and technical, rather than 
legal, body.110 Its task is to ensure that the outer limits to the continental 
shelf as submitted by States are consistent with the complex criteria laid out 
in the LOSC.111 The Commission does not have a mandate to address 
sovereignty concerns or overlapping claims and will not assess submissions 
in an area where a maritime dispute exists.112 The Commission’s 
recommendations are also specifically without prejudice to the delimitation 
of maritime boundaries.113 Ultimately, these conflicts will have to be 
resolved by the Arctic coastal states themselves, either through cooperative 
approaches or perhaps through maritime delimitation for areas beyond 200 
nm from the coast.114  
 It is also worth noting that most—if not all—of the oil and gas bearing 
sedimentary basins of the Arctic that have been analyzed fall within 200 nm 
of the coast. Thus, these areas are mostly within the declared EEZs of the 
Arctic littoral States, a fact that somewhat undermines the media portrayals 
of an Arctic resource free-for-all in respect of outer continental shelf.115  
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Norway, 38 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L LAW 375, 376 (2007) (“The preamble of the 2006 Agreement 
[Norway-Denmark] indicates that the parties intend to revert to the delimitation of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles . . . .”). 
 115. Donald L. Gautier et al., Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic, 324 
SCIENCE 1175, 1175–77 (2009) (illustrating location of oil and gas bearing sediments). 
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V. ARCTIC GOVERNANCE OPTIONS 
 In May 2008, ministers from all five Arctic coastal states issued the 
Ilulissat Declaration.116 This document emphasizes the “sovereignty, 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction” of the five Arctic coastal States over 
“large areas” of the Arctic Ocean.117  The Arctic littoral States noted that 
the LOSC was the “extensive international legal framework” applicable to 
the Arctic Ocean, and that it provides a “solid foundation for responsible 
management . . . through national implementation and application of 
relevant provisions.”118  
 The five Arctic coastal states emphasized their commitment to “the 
orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims” and acknowledged 
their “stewardship” responsibilities, principally via existing soft law 
instruments such as regional cooperation mechanisms under the Arctic 
Council.119 Interestingly, other non-littoral Arctic States and indigenous 
groups such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) were not included in 
discussions over the content of the declaration.120 The ICC responded that the 
Ilulissat Declaration “ignores” the role that the Inuit should be playing.121 
 This national sovereignty and sovereign rights-oriented approach is at 
odds with the views expressed by leading environmental NGOs, such as the 
World Wildlife Fund, which has suggested that the LOSC alone is not 
enough.122 There is continuous and growing pressure from external State 
actors in the Arctic governance system. Recently, the European Parliament 
passed a resolution calling on the European Commission to take a 
“proactive role” in the Arctic.123 It controversially called for an international 
treaty for the protection of the Arctic “having as its inspiration the Antarctic 
Treaty . . . .”124 Following this controversial announcement, the EU 
Commission released a communication on the Arctic that dropped the 
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language on adoption of an “Arctic Treaty,” but outlined a policy of 
systematic engagement in Arctic environmental protection, human rights, 
research, and multilateral governance.125 States with minimal territorial 
geopolitical interests but seeking opportunities in emerging economic 
sectors will continue to press for influence and action at the Arctic table. 
South Korea, and China are ad hoc observers to the Arctic Council and will 
remain key economic and trade influences for Canada and the Arctic states. 
South Korea and China will also continue to invest in scientific 
infrastructure and engage in scientific partnerships with Arctic and non-
Arctic states. 
 The growth in energy, navigation, fisheries, and tourism sectors in the 
Arctic all pose distinct challenges for Canada’s domestic and international 
Arctic policy platform. The development implementation of Canada’s 
Ocean Management approach126 and Northern Strategy127 are of interest and 
relevance, but a detailed analysis of this regime is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Key instruments within the Oceans Management approach will be 
the continued development and effectiveness of integrated management 
initiatives, such as the Beaufort Sea and the Gulf of St. Lawrence Large 
Ocean Management Areas (LOMAs). The development of marine protected 
areas under processes established in the Oceans Act and the Federal Marine 
Protected Areas Strategy will be important for the identification and 
conservation of Arctic biodiversity that is both domestically and 
internationally significant. The five-year funding program, Health of the 
Oceans,128 has advanced policy development for a range of domestic and 
international Arctic issues. Under this initiative, Canada has contributed to 
several Arctic Council initiatives, including building capacity on a circum-
Arctic ecosystem based management approach; co-leading the International 
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment; and researching and developing 
pollution mitigation and oil spill capacity and emergency response expertise.  
 Many initiatives are at an early phase of development—their 
effectiveness in delivering sustainable Arctic development has not been 
assessed, but it is noted for future work. Clearly Canada is interested in 
investing in a multilateral approach to Arctic management expertise in 
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addition to its domestic capacity. Canada’s Northern Strategy is a holistic  
government approach to addressing Arctic sovereignty and sustainable 
development. It addresses issues relating to Arctic sovereignty, 
environmental heritage, social and economic development in the North, and 
devolution of governance to Northern people and communities. Recent 
actions under the sovereignty theme include the development of a new 
icebreaker, developing security capacity in the form of a new Canadian 
Forces Army Training Centre in Resolute Bay, and a deep water berthing 
and fueling facility in Nanisivik. Through the strategy, the Canadian 
government has strengthened maritime regulations by introducing new 
ballast water regulations and amending the Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act. It is investing in economic development with $1.8 billion 
(CA) in offshore oil and gas exploration licenses in the Beaufort Sea and a 
range of initiatives that support social development in the North.  Canada 
continues to promote this two track strategy of “hard” military and civil 
infrastructure investment in the North and a raft of “soft” power initiatives 
including international scientific and environmental policy engagement. 
 It is a turbulent and changing time for Arctic governance, and we 
identify three scenarios for the future that will influence Canadian Arctic 
policy: a “status quo” regime, a mixed reform regime, and a new binding 
international regime.129 The status quo option is a likely scenario, 
particularly because Arctic coastal states are unlikely to relinquish 
sovereignty or sovereign rights to a new binding multilateral regime. The 
divergence of political opinion over the Arctic governance and ongoing 
geopolitical positioning render it difficult to reach an agreement that 
relinquishes sovereign rights. Nevertheless, progressive reforms could be 
made within the existing political framework. In this status quo scenario, 
the Arctic Council would remain the dominant soft law regime for 
cooperation, and national action would continue under existing national and 
international instruments, such as the LOSC. 
 A “flexible approach to norm-building” within existing frameworks 
appears to be a likely way to move forward on difficult international issues 
and improve governance.130 A mixed reform regime would seek to reform 
and address the inefficiencies and gaps in the existing “unambitious 
regime.”131 This scenario would occur as Arctic States (and other states 
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with interests in the region) move ahead on an issue-by-issue basis under 
international frameworks such as the LOSC, with Article 122 on regional 
cooperation in semi-enclosed seas (the “regional seas approach”) offering a 
potential model for building collaborative measures and avoiding a lowest 
common denominator approach.132 This regime would retain the principle 
of sovereign rights but increase cooperation on critical multilateral issues, 
such as fisheries management, shipping and navigation, and mineral 
development. There is considerable room for improving regulations 
pertaining to those issues that have existing international infrastructure, 
such as fisheries. 
 The final scenario of a comprehensive binding international regime— 
i.e., an “Arctic Treaty”—is unlikely. Arctic states do not demonstrate the 
political will to move in this direction, preferring to focus on cooperative 
approaches.133 Several ideas have been discussed that would create a 
binding pan-Arctic treaty mechanism, loosely based on the Antarctic model. 
In the short term, however, this is highly unlikely, despite the EU 
parliamentary resolution and the desires of some NGOs who have urged for 
the adoption of such a treaty. 
 The range of instruments and alternatives offers wide scope for 
interpretation of the future governance of the Arctic and the role of Canada 
within this regime. Getting the balance right between oceans development 
and conservation in an era of international engagement and interest in the 
Arctic will be a major challenge for the Canadian government. 
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